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Knowledge is, today, considered as the main source of economic growth (OECD, 2001). As 
scientific and technologic knowledge is widely cumulative and progressive (Foray, 2000), the 
interest for this good increases as soon as its role is analysed in the innovation process. 
Knowledge creation is then a function of the anterior knowledge stock. It is guided by past 
discoveries, inventions and errors. 
Creation mainly resulting from new combination of existing knowledge, firms must try to 
benefit from diversified knowledge sources in order to innovate. Knowledge spillovers are 
one of these sources. They can be defined as knowledge benefit acquired by a firm or a person 
who is not responsible for the initial investment (Almeida et Kogut, 1999)  
Griliches’ prior work (1979) establishes that knowledge spillovers do exist and that they 
matter a lot to explain the economic growth. This is confirmed by the literature on 
endogenous growth. Ever since, many scholars have been interested in this subject and more 
specifically on their impact and diffusion. Geographical distance became soon the central 
matter of these studies.  
This can partly be explained by two theoretical events in economics. First, in the late 70s, 
economists started to model imperfect competition. They allowed to explain growth 
difference between firms and by extension between regions. Second, evolutionary theory 
(Nelson et Winter, 1982, Dosi, 1988) distinguished tacit knowledge from codified knowledge. 
This differentiation, now common, is based on the degree of knowledge accessibility and on 
its nature (Malerba and Orsenigo, 2000). Tacit knowledge is, by definition, not explicitly 
described. At contrary, codified knowledge is perfectly explicit
1. These two types of 
knowledge do not require the same mechanisms of transmission. Tacit knowledge is usually 
transmitted by face-to-face interactions as learning this knowledge entails experience through 
social relations and apprenticeship-relationships (Foray, Lundvall, 1996, p.20). Codified 
knowledge can be transmitted as a message or any other formalised support, such as a 
scientific article (Cohendet, Llerena, 1999). This sort of knowledge can then be transmitted 
without any interactions. 
These two events lead to underline that economic growth difference can be explained by 
knowledge access. The question of knowledge transfer and consequently of spillovers is 
associated with that of geographic proximity. The importance of co-localisation is confirmed 
by a stylised fact about the success of SME in the so-called “Third Italy” (Becattini 1990). 
These firms had economic and innovative performances by being localised in bounded 
geographic areas. As a consequence, scholars were induced to ask the question of the 
foundations of the agglomeration of economic activities. 
Therefore, because of the tacit nature of knowledge, it is widely admitted that spillovers are 
localised. This result partly justifies economic policy that leads to the building of technopoles, 
clusters. 
 
In the same time, knowledge creation has become more and more of a collective 
phenomenon, all the more as knowledge is divided and dispersed (Machlup, 1983). 
Interactions between agents allow to nearer complementary knowledge pieces and to combine 
them, in an original way. This explains widely why firms have resorted, in an increasing way, 
to technological cooperation since the 80s (Hagedoorn, 2002). But contrary to what one could 
expect, cooperation is not always local. 
                                                 
1 Codified knowledge is a « message which can be manipulated like information » (Foray, 2000, p.48). 
1. INTRODUCTION     3 
 
The objective of this article is to examine the diffusion of spillovers within technological 
cooperation. More precisely, we shall ask to what extent permanent geographic proximity, 
defined, as co-location by the geography of innovation, is really necessary to benefit from 
spillovers when agents cooperate.  
The section 2 examines the local dimension of spillovers. Despite a consensus on this result, it 
appears that on the one hand, economic models have difficulties to take into account the 
geographical dimension and on the other hand, only few of them study the channels of 
spillovers diffusion. These two limits reduce the significance of the result obtained. This leads 
us to analyse knowledge flows and to question the need of co-localisation to catch them.  
A particular form of interaction, the technological cooperation, is studied in section 3. The 
objective is to show why this organisation can be viewed as a vector of spillovers. 
In that respect, as cooperation is realised with local or remote partners, section 4 examines the 
conditions of spillovers diffusion. It turns out that co-localisation is not a sufficient condition; 
geographic proximity is often required but it can be temporary. This condition must be linked 
with organisational proximity to be effective. Then, it appears that spillovers are not “in the 






The literature on innovative milieus and clusters (Saxenian, 1994, Beccatini, 1990) underlines 
the importance of interactions and exchange of knowledge between agents located in these 
areas. In fact, knowledge considered as the most useful in the innovative process, is generally 
tacit. It is widely acknowledged that tacit knowledge requires geographical proximity.  
These works underline the development of a new local industrial organisation, which offers 
additional economic performances for the firms due to spillovers. These approaches consider 
that the concentration of activities allows spillovers diffusion according to the nature of 
knowledge. 
However, these approaches postulate more than they demonstrate, the effectiveness of the need 
of geographic proximity for the spreading of knowledge spillovers. In fact, the empirical 
analyses are mainly case studies which do not propose actual tools to measure spillovers. 
Moreover, they evaluate the role of different actors and their interactions in a given limited 
geographical area, without looking at the connexions with the other areas. The argument 
retained is that the essential knowledge for innovation is tacit; its diffusion requires face-to-
face relations. Spillovers which come from innovation are then necessarily tacit, hence their 
localised dimension. Geographic proximity
2 is a postulated necessary condition for knowledge 
transfer. 
 
Models of the geography of innovation try and verify the role of geographic proximity in the 
circulation of spillovers. However, despite a certain consensus, they face a few limits. 
                                                 
2 Agents are considered as being geographically close to each other when they can have daily face-to-face 
relationships. 
2.  LOCAL DIMENSION OF SPILLOVERS   4 
2.1. CO-LOCALISATION AS A VECTOR OF SPILLOVERS: MODELS OF GEOGRAPHY 
OF INNOVATION 
 
The models of the geography of innovation measure from which distance spillovers can impact 
the geographic unity performance. The common problematic consists then in modelling 
spillovers and their local dimension. 
Autant-Bernard and Massard (1999) identify four types of models in this approach, each of 
them developing a particular method to measure the spatial dimension of spillovers : 
•  Patent citations are viewed as markers of externalities: the article by Jaffe, Trajtenberg 
and Henderson (1993) is based on the idea that if spillovers are localised, a firm will 
use preferably the stock of the local knowledge. They test the correspondence between 
the localisation of patent citations and the localisation of original patent. For the 
patents granted in 1980, citing patents are in general, localised in the same geographic 
area than the cited patent. The authors conclude that spillovers are localised. 
•  The second type of models deals with geographic concentration of innovation: 
Audretsch and Feldman (1994) show that R&D activities are more concentrated than 
those of production. They infer that this result is the sign of localised spillovers 
existence.  
•  The third type develops the concept of geographic coincidence to test the importance 
of geographic proximity: Jaffe (1989) studies the impact of university R&D on the 
knowledge production of the firms. He tests a function of knowledge production 
(Griliches, 1979) with exogenous variables such as firms and university R&D, and 
geographic coincidence. He establishes that spillovers spreading are favoured by 
geographic coincidence between universities and firms. 
•  The last approach is focusing on local interactions: those models will be developed 
latter. They reach the same kind of conclusion. 
 
Despites the diversity of methods used, these models all conclude on the existence of spillovers 
and on their geographic bounded flows, confirming the results of the previous approaches. In 
fact, they reach the same conclusion from the point of view of the analysis of the 
agglomeration of the activities (Anselin et al. 1997). Scholars examine the part of spillovers 
using the prior works of Marshall (1920). Spillovers are the foundations of agglomeration of 
activities and firms. They are geographically bounded. Thus firms must be localised near the 
source of the spillovers to benefit from them. In fact, as innovation naturally produces 
spillovers (because some knowledge are not perfectly appropriable), agglomeration is much 
more pronounced in these activities than in production (Audretsch and Feldman 1994). In other 
words, being at proximity of the sources of spillovers is a necessary and sufficient condition to 
benefit from spillovers.  
 
2.2. CONDITIONS OF THE TRANSFER OF SPILLOVERS 
 
Two elements require to be more deeply studied in order to confirm the need of geographical 
proximity. First, these approaches face problems to model spatial dimension, reducing the 
significance of these results. Second, the question of spillovers diffusion is, paradoxically, 
little studied. Indeed, few models analyse the conditions to capture and use spillovers and the 
canals of transmission. In this case, the central role of geographic proximity is postulated. 
   5 
2.2.1.  A partial measure of space 
As we noticed, the objective of the geography of innovation is to model both spillovers and 
their spatial dimension. But studies face difficulties to do it simultaneously. They model either 
space or spillovers and they are obliged to suppose the remaining dimension. 
One difficulty
3 they face is to model spatial dimension. Some models suppose that there are 
spillovers and they measure their effects. The local dimension is then often pre-defined by the 
authors, using administrative unity: Jaffe (1989) utilizes States, Anselin et al. (1997), the  
county, Autant-Bernard (2000) the French “departement”. If these unities are practical as they 
allow to obtain figures and statistics, they do not allow to measure local networks 
specificities, showed by the approach of districts.  
Moreover, there are few comparisons with other geographic spaces. The models test the 
existence of spillovers inside a geographically bounded zone. Finally, the measure of 
geographical proximity (coincidence…) is pre-defined by authors but these indicators are not 
neutral on the results (Anselin et al., 1997). 
It seems then interesting to attempt to take into account these limits in order to consolidate 
their results. However, other studies show that when policies are implemented in order to 
make profit of the results, put in evidence by the geography of innovation, geographical 
proximity, on its own, is not a sufficient condition to spillovers flows. 
 
Indeed, the models of the geography of innovation essentially test the local dimension of 
spillovers. They do not include explicative variables which could explain this result. Being 
near the sources of spillovers allows to catch them. Filippi and Torre show, through the 
example of the implementation of a Network of Technology Diffusion, that geographic 
proximity is not a sufficient condition to capture spillovers. We rapidly present this case 
study.  
Believing in the crucial role of geographical proximity, Public Authorities have implemented 
Networks of Technology Diffusion in different French regions in order to encourage 
knowledge transmission in Small and Medium Enterprises. This implementation on local 
level is based on the tacit dimension of knowledge. NTDs support a policy that aims to 
ensure, by means of different types of incentives, the primacy of synergies at a local level, 
presupposing that these synergies are conducive to development. The hypothesis is that 
constructed geographical proximity (that means decided by authorities) is conducive to the 
diffusion of knowledge. 
The policy consists of creating local network, when they do not exist, or of supporting cross-
cooperation between partners belonging to different “worlds” such as university, firms of 
different sectors... The authors compare these policies in three different regions (Corsica, 
Aquitaine and Rhones-Alpes). Despite differences of economic development in these three 
entities, the results are similar in the three and very divergent from original objectives. The 
co-ordination between spontaneous and institutional networks remains partial, and more often 
than not, the original objectives of public authorities have not been reached or are modified in 
the course of action. The main result is that institutional network find difficulties to connect 
with private network because of the heterogeneity (Rhones-Alpes) of this latter or of its 
frontiers which are much further that those of region (all of three). 
 
                                                 
3 Another difficulty is to model spillovers but it does not give rise to a more thorough study, 
as it is not the heart of our subject here.  
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This case study shows then that geographical proximity, as the only condition for knowledge 
transmission, fails as a form of proximity that organises the activities of innovation. It can 
easily be deduced that spillovers cannot flow in such a configuration. 
 
Then, as geographical proximity, on its own, does not consist of a means of spillovers 
transmission, it is crucial, in order to understand this activity to study their means of 
transmission. This has become more important since the recent work of Autant-Bernard 
(2000). She attempts to get round the fact that models bound a priori the space in which 
spillovers are supposed to exist. Taking into account three levels of localisation 
(“departement”, neighbour “departements” and other), she puts in evidence that spillovers 
diffusion is locally stronger but that it is as well geographically larger, more particularly for 
spillovers coming from public research. This tends to confirm the results of Anselin et al. 
(1997). Even, if more studies have to be done in this direction, these first results need to be 
explained, as the diffusion is not anymore only local.  
 
2.2.2.  From a logic of diffusion to a logic of learning and interaction 
The approaches of the geography of innovation suppose that being at proximity is a necessary 
and sufficient condition to benefit from spillovers. This is based on two hypothesises: first, 
following Marshall quotation, spillovers are “in the airs”, they are freely available; second, 
everyone is able to capture spillovers. The only restriction to diffusion is that, according to 
knowledge transmission, spillovers are local public good.  
Today, the hypothesis of perfect availability of information has been widely given up by the 
different approaches of economics. It is widely admitted that there is a cost to knowledge 
acquisition. Knowledge is not available for all in the same way. It is then impossible to 
consider that knowledge circulates freely in the airs. 
 
In that respect, it becomes necessary to analyse the conditions of spillovers diffusion and the 
relationship between the transmitter and receiver. First, a pre-requisite “organisational” 
condition is necessary: The models presented until now suppose that agents are able to use 
spillovers. In fact, spillovers are not simply a free emission of knowledge by one agent but 
they are knowledge pieces used by other agents. The definition of spillovers indeed implies 
that someone necessarily exploits them. Then, if knowledge is accessible (thank to 
interactions, patents...), agents must first be able to absorb and understand it to benefit from it. 
Second, the analysis of the interactions must be reinforced to explain spillovers spreading. 
The models of the geography of innovation mainly do not consider the channels of 
transmission. As we noticed, they test the co-localisation of the activities. Only few models 
(the latest category of models) view interactions as channels of spillovers diffusion. They may 
contribute to modify the relation between spillovers and geographic proximity.  
 
Firms’ absorptive capacity 
Contrary to the traditional analysis (Arrow, 1962), access to knowledge is not free. To benefit 
from knowledge externalities, it is necessary to possess the related competences and know-
how. Then, firms must develop their absorptive capacity (Cohen et Levinthal, 1989) in order 
to identify, understand and exploit external knowledge. This concept can be defined as the 
level of external knowledge that a firm can use. It is a function of the internal R&D level and 
of the external knowledge characteristics. More precisely, it depends on the stock of 
knowledge and on its diversity. The more a firm has varied knowledge, the more it is 
supposed to be able to absorb spillovers.   7 
Thus, R&D does not only allow the production of new knowledge but it also allows to 
increase the capacity of the firm to assimilate existing knowledge. Taking into account the 
absorptive capacity leads to limit the impact of spillovers. In fact, all the firms are not able to 
benefit from them. They must reach a critical R&D threshold and possess knowledge that is 
technologically close to the emitted spillovers
4.  
 
It is interesting to notice that Cohen and Levinthal (1989) do not tackle the question of 
localisation of the agents in their analysis of the conditions of the absorption of spillovers. 
They only insist on the technological distance between the transmitter and the receiver of the 
spillovers. In that respect, we conclude that geographic proximity is not a sufficient condition 
to benefit from spillovers.  
Moreover, if these authors underline the importance of this capacity, they precise neither the 
channel of transmission of spillovers nor the organization in which the absorptive capacity is 
developed (Bach and Lhuillery 1999). In other words, they do not analyse which types of 
organizations link transmitter and receiver of these spillovers. 
 
Interactions facilitate the circulation of spillovers 
Cockburn and Henderson (1998) consider that if absorptive capacity is necessary to identify 
and use external knowledge, it does not constitute a sufficient condition. Studying knowledge 
externalities between public research and private research, they consider that despite the 
traditional sources of spillovers (articles, conferences), firms must develop «  active  » 
cooperations with public laboratories if they want to capture spillovers from these institutions. 
This study underlines the need of contact with the source of spillovers and then the role of 
interactions.  
In the same way, Zucker et al. (1994) show the role of interactions rather than co-location. 
Their first model establishes that innovative performance of biotechnology firms is positively 
associated with the total number of articles by local university “star” scientist (at least in 
California, the State where they realise their survey). They conclude that spillovers are 
localised. However, in the second model, they differentiate the scientists who are in relation 
with at least one firm (linked scientists
5), the pure academic researchers and the affiliated 
researchers (i.e. integrated in the staff of the firm). Researchers of the latest two types do not 
product positive effects on the firms’ performance, contrary to the first ones. Then, inside a 
territory, it is not so much the geographic proximity that account as the nature of the relations 
between agents. Indeed, the public researchers, localised in California but without links with 
firms, do not produce any effects on firm performance. Their results are then very interesting 
as they enlighten us on two points: first, geographic proximity is not sufficient to benefit from 
spillovers emitted by university. Second, spillovers must be analysed through the study of 
interactions.  
 
The main idea of these models is that one of the privileged channels of spillovers is 
interaction. Going further, Zucker (2001, p.22) clearly shows that when there are no links 
between agents, there cannot be spillovers diffusion. However, these models do not 
sufficiently take into account the spatial dimension. The first model does not even evoke 
space. The second one only studies the spreading inside a given geographic area, California. It 
concludes that co-localisation is not a sufficient condition but as it does not give any 
information of the spillovers coming from further zone, it is impossible to know if it is a 
                                                 
4 Moreover, contrary to the traditional analysis, the existence of spillovers leads to an increase in R&D spending. 
5 Linked scientists are those who have co-published with researchers of a biotechnology firm but who do not 
appear in the organisation chart of the firm (at the difference of affiliated scientists).   8 
necessary condition. Moreover, these models only study public-private relations. It would be 
necessary to test other types of relations and to include spatial dimension. 
 
 
The results of the approaches on districts and the geography of innovation conclude on the 
local dimension of spillovers, mainly because of the tacit nature of knowledge. However, 
these models suppose more than they demonstrate these results. The difficulty of modelling 
space and the analysis of the conditions of the transmission of spillovers lead to question these 
results. More precisely, we have showed that co-localisation is not a sufficient condition to 
catch spillovers. On the contrary, it appears that being in touch with the source of knowledge 
and to possess a certain absorptive capacity are central conditions for that purpose. The logic 
of diffusion must be then narrowly linked to the one of learning. In that respect, we wonder if 
all spillovers are bounded in space and more precisely, if it is possible to capture them at a 
distance. For that purpose, interactions must be more studied, in order to propose other spaces 
of diffusion.  
 
 
Griliches (1998) points to the importance of interaction between actors instead of the rather 
freewheeling involuntary character of spillovers.  
“Knowledge is not like a stock of ore, sitting there waiting to be mined. It is an extremely 
heterogeneous assortment of information in continuous flows. Only a small part of it is of any 
use to someone at a particular point of time and it takes effort and resources to access, retrieve 
and adapt it to one’s own use. Thus models of externalities must perforce be models of 
interaction between different actors in the economy” (Griliches, 1998, cited by Veugelers and 
De Backer). 
Among a vast number of transmission channels (patents, colloquies, publications, workers 
mobility…), technological cooperation seems interesting to study as a form of organisation in 
which links between the transmitter and the receiver of spillovers can be analysed (what 
required Bach and Lhuillery, 1999). Moreover, cooperation has become a very sought-after 
organisational form to have access to external knowledge sources (Mowery, Oxley, 
Silverman, 1996). Thus, Hagedoorn (2002) notices that on the one hand, firms turn in an 
increasing way to technological cooperation, especially in high-tech industries, since the 80s; 
and that on the other hand, partners frequently belong to different geographic zones. 
Cooperation contributes to the creation of networks of which frontiers are not localised. 
Moreover, such an organisation requires important knowledge transfer between partners to 
reach their collective objective of innovation. Finally, cooperation is a means to increase the 
absorptive capacity
6.  
Despite Griliches “recommendations”, this choice can seem surprising as on the one hand, 
cooperation relationships are usually at least partly market relations, and on the other hand, 
the standard literature considers cooperation as a means to internalise spillovers (2.1.). 
However, previous studies analysed mainly involuntary spillovers (Veugelers and De 
Backer). At the risk of modifying their definition, involuntary as well as voluntary spillovers 
are studied in this article. Incomplete contract theory can partly explain the concept of 
                                                 
6 The process of auto-reinforcement can be noticed as absorptive capacity is required to cooperate but 
cooperation increases it (Mangematin and Nesta, 1999). 
3.  TWO APPROACHES OF THE RELATION: COOPERATION  AND 
SPILLOVERS   9 
cooperation as a vector of spillovers. Nevertheless, this approach tends to assimilate 
cooperation to a one-shot game. The specificities of knowledge and of the innovation process 
must then be taken into account. It results in the idea that voluntary or involuntary knowledge 
transfer between organisations generates important spillovers (2.2.).  
 
 
3.1. A  TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS: COOPERATION AS A MECHANISM OF SPILLOVERS 
INTERNALISATION 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
The neoclassical theory considers spillovers as market failures, as they have an influence on 
agents without going through price mechanisms. From a standard theory point of view, it is 
necessary in order to assure market  functioning, to overcome thank through internalisation.  
Internalisation mechanisms aim to compensate ineffectiveness generated by spillovers. This 
allows to obtain (or to tend to) a pareto-optimal equilibrium.  
The resort to other forms of organisation such as the firm or the government, can constitute a 
means to internalise these failures. More recently, cooperation has appeared as an intermediary 
solution, less constraining. We present a model by d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) which 
compares firm’s effectiveness with the one in cooperation when there are spillovers.  
 
3.1.1.  Cooperation as a solution to the deficit of incitement to innovate 
Knowledge spillovers allow to increase the stock of the common knowledge of the society. If 
social return is higher than the private one, agents face a problem of incitement to innovate. A 
solution must be found; it must allow to establish an equilibrium between the preservation of 
creator interests and the maintaining of social benefits. 
The resort to appropriation instruments such as patent, secret... is not always perfectly efficient 
because of the imperfection of these proprietary “rights”. It is then widely admitted in 
economic literature that firm’s R&D activities create positive externalities to competitive firms. 
This leads to an under-investment in R&D in comparison to social optimum (Combe, 1998, 
p.454). R&D cooperation constitutes then a means to reduce this under-investment in allowing 
to internalise spillovers. 
 
D’Aspremont and Jacquemin model (1988) constitutes a seminal article of the models which 
study the relationship between R&D cooperation and incitement to innovate. Authors 
examine the impact of cooperation on the R&D effort thanks to a Cournot duopoly model. 
They consider three possible two-step games:  
-  Firms do not cooperate. They are competitor. 
-  Firms cooperate only on R&D activities. They remain competitor at the production 
level (partial cooperation).  
-  Firms cooperate for both activities (total cooperation). 
 
From a production function with exogenous spillovers, authors calculate the level of R&D 
spending and of production for these three configurations and for the social optimum. When 
spillovers are high, the level of R&D spending, in partial cooperation, is superior to the one of 
non-cooperative situation but inferior to the one in total cooperation
7. 
 
                                                 
7 These results are verified by ulterior models. Cf. De bondt (1996) for a review.   10 
Cooperation, when spillovers are important, allows then to increase the incitement to 
innovate, even if the obtained results are inferior to the one of social optimum. The decision 
to cooperate is based then on the level of appropriation of innovations.  
This model shows that cooperation allows to limit spillovers effects. Nevertheless, this model 
(and the one which he has inspired) meets some limits. 
3.1.2.  The impossibility to internalise all the spillovers 
Although these limits refer directly to d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) model, most of 
them can be generalised to the approaches which consider cooperation as a means to 
internalise spillovers. 
The first limit is that these models allow rarely empirical studies. It can be explained by the 
difficulty to foresee ex ante (before the decision to cooperate) the intensity of knowledge 
created ex post with an uncertain probability.  
Moreover, this model considers only cooperation between competitors. However, empirical 
studies show that the types of partners are more diversified.  
Furthermore, this approaches which consists of considering cooperation as a means to 
internalise spillovers, reduce the field of cooperation. According to these authors, it seems 
that it is spillovers existence that leads firms to cooperate. The analysis implies that firms are 
identical. They are then perfectly able to develop themselves knowledge but spillovers 
presence reduces their activity. Cooperation is only a means to overcome market failures. 
Finally, this approach considers knowledge as information. According to the hypotheses on 
information nature, knowledge is then accessible to everyone. However, as noticed, some 
conditions are required if firms want to benefit from spillovers (absorptive capacity, sector ...). 
Moreover, literature on Knowledge economy underlines the non-homogeneity of knowledge. 
These two elements call into question the hypothesis emitted in the model of d’Aspremont et 
al. (1988), of the exogeneity of innovation appropriability (Combe, 1998). 
 
Besides these first limits, we consider that cooperation allows only a partial internalisation of 
spillovers following two explanations: 
Spillovers issue cannot be reduced to a bilateral problem. Indeed, they constitute a diffuse 
phenomenon involving a great number of agents linked by direct or indirect, formal or 
informal, relationships (Massard, 1997). As spillovers benefit depends on their absorptive 
capacity, on the external knowledge accessibility of the agents …, the transmitter should sign a 
cooperation agreement with every beneficiary. But it is not in their interest to become apparent. 
This seems unrealisable, and even it was, transaction costs would be such an amount that firm 
would have interest to realise no R&D activity. Thus, if cooperative firms reduce the risks of 
the diffusion of their knowledge, they cannot internalise all the spillovers.  
Finally, this approach considers spillovers originating in the R&D results of cooperation. 
However, if we consider that firms do not have the same initial stock of knowledge, they may 
be, for their partners, a vector of spillovers. These latter would come from knowledge 
developed before cooperation. This leads us to distinguish cooperation as a « canalizer » of ex 
post spillovers and cooperation as vector of spillovers. In the first case, cooperation does not 
aim to suppress spillovers, resulting from collective creation process. It limits only their extent 
to partners (d'Aspremont et al., 1988; Coase, 1960). In the second case, privileged relationships 
lead every partner to benefit, during cooperation, from knowledge acquired previously by each 
of them ; and that without this exchange goes through a market relation. We will go deeply into 
this last point. 
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3.2. A  NEW CONCEPTION: COOPERATION AS A VECTOR OF SPILLOVERS 
 
The district approaches have, since a long time, underlined the role of local interactions in 
knowledge diffusion. However, despite the empirical limits, already noticed, let us remember 
that every interaction, every exchange, is susceptible to be a source of spillovers (Cassiman 
and Veugelers, 2001). Technological cooperation can then constitute one of these interactions.  
Technological cooperation corresponds to a common project of the creation of a new product 
or process (Rullière et Torre, 1995, p.226). The motives for engaging in alliances are 
numerous, as observed in many studies (Porter et Fuller, 1986, Contractor and Lorange, 1988, 
Hagedoorn and Schakenraad, 1991). It allows sharing costs/risks, access to partner’s know-
how/market/products, efficiency enhancement such as economies of scale, synergy effects 
from exchanging/sharing complementary know-how. This touches upon competitive 
considerations too, such as influence on other alliance activities, on competitive structure… 
Empirical studies show that it is essentially the need to access to complementary competences 
that leads firms to this form of organisation. The question of the internalisation of spillovers is 
never directly evoked. 
 
These alternative (or complementary?) strategies to d’Aspremont and Jacquemin‘s approach, 
lead to propose different reasons to justify the obvious assertion, previously enounced, that 
every transfer is a source of spillovers. The existence of incomplete contracts constitutes a 
first justification, even if it contributes to reduce the temporal conception of cooperation. It is 
more the characteristics of the innovation process that legitimate the fact that cooperation is a 
vector of spillovers. Such a result has an impact on the decision to cooperate. 
 
 
If strategy leads firms to cooperate, the questions linked to partners’ control, to the sharing of 
the results and to the organisation of the relation in general, are not fixed for all that. They 
generally lead to the signature of a contract. According to the complexity and specificity of 
these organisations, and to the informational problems, relations of cooperation are submitted 
to important uncertainties (moral hazard, adverse selection present in every cooperation but 
also to uncertainties on the innovation process and the use of knowledge). The description of 
all the future eventualities is then rarely possible. Contracts are incomplete. 
These contracts foresee mechanisms allowing to determinate appropriated actions for what 
would not explicitly be stipulated in the contract. In other words, “a mechanism indicating to 
agents which behavior they have to adopt, must substitute for routines when these latter are 
not pertinent any more”, (Brousseau, 1993, p.75, translated by the author). It can be, among 
others possibilities, the re-negotiation of the agreement or the designation of an authority
8. 
This role of referee can be attributed to one of the partners or to an external part. 
 
It is surprising that incomplete contracts theory has never been directly linked with the one of 
knowledge economy. However, the problem of incomplete contracts is fundamental when 
collaboration is about knowledge because of the characteristics of non-excludability, non-
rivalry and tacitness of this latter one. Indeed, even if knowledge is partly appropriable, to 
make pay the right price is difficult as potential use of this good is uncertain. This leads to 
reinforce the problem of the incompleteness of contracts. 
                                                 
8 "Authority is a right of commands, contractually established. It allows to a contractor or a group of contractors 
to decide of effective use of resources brought by each of them. It is a mechanism complementary to routines. Its 
existence is justified as soon as these latter are not efficient any more […]. Authority is an answer to uncertainty, 
which is characteristic of number of transactions and cooperation (Williamson, 1975, 1985)", (Brousseau, 1993, 
p.75).   12 
In principle, as soon as an unexpected event has occurred, the resort to a mechanism of 
“relation management” allows to find a solution. This is only possible if the new realised state 
of nature is observable and verifiable. Let’s study the case where one of the partners adopts 
opportunist behaviour. 
 
In a technological cooperation, the behaviour of one of the partners can involve an unforeseen 
situation. Thus, when contracts are incomplete, agents can adopt opportunist behaviour. 
“Opportunism appears when an agent does not respect his engagement” (Brousseau, 1993, 
p.107)
9. It generates a problem of moral hazard. This latter “is linked to the loss that an agent 
occasions when he does not give the counterpart expected by the other and that this latter 
cannot measure precisely the injury” (Brousseau, 1993, p.107).  
Thus, if we consider that agent’s engagement is not to use exchanged knowledge for a private 
use (i.e. beyond cooperation), the non-respect of this promise by the agent is the sign of the 
adoption of opportunist behaviour. It results then moral hazard problems. The opportunist 
agent does not give the counterpart of the use of this knowledge (by paying, for instance, the 
owner). As a principle, mechanisms allowing to take into account this situation should be put 
in place (resort to authority or re-negotiation of contract). 
 
However, these mechanisms are not always applicable. Indeed, knowledge use is not always 
observable. Control is made difficult as knowledge is non-rival. The victim partner must 
follow the knowledge creation process of his partner, during and after cooperation, to be able 
to observe unexpected use. Moreover, he must be able to measure precisely the prejudice that 
he suffers. 
Moreover, this use can be not easily verifiable. It can be hard to bring evidences that some 
knowledge have been used, without authorisation. Indeed, firms have their own projects that 
they develop in the same time that cooperative projects. To prove that external resources 
contribute to internal research use, can be a difficult task (Lerner et Merges, 1998, p.127). 
Moreover, it is tricky to distinguish knowledge stemmed from own research to the one 
captured by interactions.  
 
The renegotiation of the contract or a new decision of the named authority is then impossible; 
it can sometimes even not be evoked. 
Thus, being opportunist, the agent benefits from knowledge he has not paid the price. Such 
knowledge corresponds to the definition of spillovers. Thus, when opportunist behaviour, 
non-sanctioned, appears, cooperation relationships are a vector of spillovers. 
 
 
If the study of opportunist behaviour allows to understand the mechanism of spillovers 
diffusion inside cooperation, it is however problematic. Indeed, in such a situation, 
cooperation can be only a one-shot game: the agent which suffers from such a behaviour 
breaks the contract with the deviant partner. Such a theoretical case does not reflect reality, in 
which cooperation appears as long and repetitive processes. 
 
To the difficult contractualisation of knowledge, it must be add, in order to understand in what 
extend cooperation can be a vector of spillovers, the specificities linked to knowledge 
production. This one is not any more considered as an isolated and impromptu phenomenon 
but as a cumulative and progressive process. During cooperation, knowledge is exchanged, 
diffused (voluntarily or not). Some of it are thus, incorporated (embodied), at least partly, by 
                                                 
9 Williamson (1994) defines it as « the research of personal interest which admits a notion of deceit ».   13 
partners. Such a mechanism can involve a modification of their mental structure and of their 
thinking framework
10. Contrary to material assets, knowledge used during cooperation can not 
be destroyed at the end of the process (it is impossible to suppress knowledge from a brain, 
and then, to prevent its holder to use it). Agents can then re-use it for their internal research, 
without being necessarily conscious of doing it. The question of the use of such knowledge 
for own utilisation, is all the more insoluble because creation process is unforeseen and 
uncontrollable.  
Moreover, some knowledge can be diffused unknown to its owner, according to its tacit 
dimension. The emitter is able not to be conscious that he has this knowledge; he can then 
emit them unconsciously (Coriat et Weinstein, 1995, p.124, Polanyi, 1954). 
 
Thus, spillovers issue is very important in the decision to cooperate. Cooperation is a means 
to access to competences: firms can cooperate for many reasons, but they always attempt to 
take advantage of the situation to access (without any contract necessarily negotiated) to 
partners’ competences (Mowery, Oxley and Silverman, 1996). Firms cooperate therefore in 
the hope of capturing spillovers.  
More precisely, according to evolutionary theory, firms are different. They have their proper 
knowledge stocks, linked to their previous activities, and which may meet appropriation 
problems. Spillovers spreading, inside cooperation, is then, not a game to nil sum. Indeed, 
every partner may benefit from spillovers, emitted by the other members. However, every one 
is conscious that he can lose a part of his cognitive advantage, during cooperation, because of 
the spillovers that he emits
11. 
 
Decision to cooperate results then of an arbitrage between the objective of the maximisation 
of incoming spillovers and the one of minimisation of outcoming spillovers. The first 
objective underlines that cooperation allows to develop interactions, vector of spillovers. The 
second objective is closely linked to the degree of knowledge appropriability of the firm. 
Inside cooperation, partners attempt to minimise outcoming information flows that do not 
directly concern the purpose of the cooperation (Cassiman and Veugelers, 2001).  
 
Cooperation is therefore a vector of spillovers. This channel can surprise. However, it owns 
characteristics similar to the other forms of interactions. More precisely, cooperation appears 
as a specific organisational form which facilitates interaction and then consequently, 
spillovers diffusion. Cooperation allows a better access to external knowledge. Indeed, 
Veugelers (1998) studies knowledge external sources et account seven mechanism to acquire 
them: Licence, R&D outsourcing, Consultancy, Acquisition of Companies, Purchase of 
equipment, Communication with other companies, Hiring skilled employees. She shows that 
firms which cooperate, use more external knowledge sources than those that do not use this 
organisational form.  
 
This section leads to a new conception of the relation cooperation/spillovers. Contrary to the 
analysis of d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), we are interesting in the inputs diffused 
during cooperation, and not on the output resulting from cooperative activities. The resort of 
                                                 
10 Knowledge acquisition and assimilation mechanisms are not easily envisaged by economists. The introduction 
of a piece of knowledge in the cognitive system can increase the knowledge stock of the receiver but can equally 
involve perturbations and then a modification of his structure of thoughts. This is completely uncontrollable by 
agents.  
11 Firms are not any more symmetric in the sense that they do not receive necessarily as much spillovers as they 
emit. In return, spillovers diffusion is done in a bilateral way, even if firms do not benefit from the same level of 
spillovers, this one depends on the characteristics of each one (absorptive capacity, competitive advantage...).   14 
cooperation is an efficient solution to internalise spillovers: this allows to reduce more 
spillovers linked to the output (i.e. realised by the cooperation) than if research activity had 
been effectuated by an individual firm. However, this approach does not take into account that 
each firm has ex ante (i.e. before cooperating), a stock of knowledge which can be submitted 
to appropriability problems. To adopt this hypothesis leads to consider that firms and public 
institutions are susceptible to emit spillovers at any time; it is not possible any more to 
consider only cooperation effect on the output of this one.  
Cooperation is a vector of spillovers in the sense that such an organisation and the numerous 
interactions which results from it, facilitate knowledge transfer. Nevertheless, such a 
conception leads to enlarge the spillovers definition. Indeed, “technological spillovers are 
most often defined as externalities, whit agents unable to fully appropriate all benefits from 
their own R&D activities”. However, they are sometimes defined in a broader sense. “R&D 
spillovers refer to the involuntary leakage, as well as, the voluntary exchange of useful 
technological information” (Steurs, 1994, p.2). In that respect, we adopt the larger definition: 
“ spillovers consist on the transmission, voluntary or not, of information which is free or price 





Cooperation is a vector of spillovers. Such a result leads us to be interested in organisations, 
and more precisely in networks as collaboration is organised as such. In this case, we wonder 
if the local dimension of spillovers is still verified, as partners are not necessarily close to 
each other. The literature on districts underlines the role of the local network in the diffusion 
of spillovers. It insists especially on the contacts that can be developed and the need for 
interactions to diffuse tacit knowledge. However, in the same time, an important literature 
appears on the development of networks and underlines their advantages without necessarily 
referring to the spatial dimension.  
A paradox then appears between the two approaches. The empirical facts show that both types 
of networks (local and a-spatial) co-exist. It seems that the question of co-localisation must be 
partly replaced by, or at least combined with, the study of organisation. The spatial and 




4.1. LOCAL NETWORK VS. A-SPATIAL NETWORK 
4.1.1.  Local network advantages 
The models of the geography of innovation conclude on the local dimension of spillovers, 
according to the tacit dimension of knowledge. Indeed, co-localisation can generate an 
organisation that links agents to each other. Geographical proximity favours knowledge flows 
about potential partners and the creation process and that for three reasons: 
Geographical proximity facilitates contacts between agents. If they were remote, they would 
not have the opportunity to meet. Indeed, agents are locally federated by official or more 
informal common instances such as Industry and Business Chambers, Unions… or local clubs 
(Autant-Bernard, 2000). This leads them to meet each other, and to know what the others do... 
                                                 
12 In this section, we will consider knowledge transfer rather than spillovers. Indeed, only the economic nature 
changes between these two concepts. Their transfer conditions are supposed to be similar and the literature 
focuses more on knowledge diffusion. As every knowledge transfer can be a source of spillovers, the results on 
knowledge diffusion can be transposed perfectly to spillovers spreading.  
 
4.  “SECRETS ARE IN NETWORKS”   15 
This can help to find new partners as agents have information on the local firms. At 
equivalent capabilities, they generally prefer working with partners next to them. 
Moreover, knowledge production calls for interactions, as new ideas come out from debate. 
Discussions allow sharing and confronting knowledge. Interactions are more efficient in a 
face-to-face situation as the discussion is more fluid, more interactive and denser. Here, the 
communication between agents is also synchronised, which contributes to increase the speed 
of decision-making. Furthermore, the creation process requires a wide variety in the types of 
knowledge (tacit and codified), which are present in personal interactions. In that respect, 
geographic proximity is de facto required. 
Finally, information seems to circulate more quickly at local level. Jaffe, Trajtenberg and 
Henderson (1992) put in evidence that the probability of citing a patent localised in the same 
region is higher in the year of the publishing of the first patent. It decreases with time. In the 
same way, Feldman (1994) underlines that knowledge crosses more easily corridors and 
streets than oceans and continents.  
 
Geographic proximity favours interactions, thus tacit knowledge diffusion. Allowing to create 
relations between different agents, it constitutes an interesting advantage for the diffusion of 
spillovers and for the building of cooperation. 
 
4.1.2. Network  Organisations 
At the same time, a large literature vaunts the merits of networks without any references to 
spatial dimension. There are no agreements on the definition of network. However, in a very 
large way, it can be defined as a set of nodes or actors (persons or organisations) linked by 
social relationships or ties. This definition is very general as the actors can be of any types 
(researchers, firms, clients, furnishers, competitors…).  Its aim can be varied such as client-
furnishers networks, subcontractor network… The study of all the kinds of networks or of the 
systemic network (i.e. the one that takes into account all the links between nodes, whatever 
the nature of the node) will go beyond the objectives of this article
13. We will focus on a 
specific but restricting kind of network: the innovative network.  
It can be defined as the organisation of heterogeneous relationships that actors develop, 
engaged in knowledge production with those that try to establish competitive advantages on 
economic markets (Callon, 1992). It is worth noticing that from that point, the innovation 
process is not anymore considered as linear. On the contrary, it insists on the role of 
interactions and retroactions with the different actors involved. The sources of innovation are 
not exclusively inside firms. They are frequently found at the chinks of firms, universities, 
furnishers and clients (Powell, 1990). The locus of innovation is not any more inside the firm, 
but inside the network of inter-organisational relationships (Powell et al., 1996). Thus, firms 
cannot innovate anymore if they are not inscribed in such an organisation.  
The definitions of innovative network (Callon, 1992, Granovetter et al., 2002…) insist on the 
diversity of the actors in this coordinated organisation (public laboratory, firms, venture 
capitalists, lawyers, public institutions…). We restrict our analysis to cooperative networks: 
networks which reflect the relations of cooperation and the links between partners. In other 
terms, the influence of public institutions, venture capitalists or any other agent which do not 
impact directly on the innovative process and knowledge transfer is not studied here. The 
advantages of connectivity and diversity of the network is still acknowledged. 
 
                                                 
13 Cf. Von Alstyne for a survey.   16 
This literature puts in evidence a new form of innovation organisation. However, in almost 
any case, authors do not refer to geographic proximity. For instance, Cassier and Foray (1999) 
study the organisation of collective innovation in Europe with mentioning the need of co-
localisation.  
 
4.1.3. A  paradox 
There is then a paradox in the literature. Part of it considers co-localisation as a necessary 
condition to innovate. Another part focuses more on the organisation of the innovation 
process. It insists on the importance of interactions and the diversity of partners, whatever the 
geographical distance is.  
This a-priori opposition can be explained by the changes in the economic system. Of course, 
geographic proximity facilitates interactions, fundamental in the innovation process. 
However, empirical facts show that at the same time, a-spatial networks have become more 
important. Market necessity, the need of competence, not locally available… lead firms to 
develop relations, and more particularly cooperation with agents localised all around the 
world. Networks whose frontiers are not any more local appear. Indeed, contrary to literature 
on « Third Italy », local networks are widely open onto exterior. It can easily be explained: 
each firm, working on very specific and specialised domains, it is unlikely that a firm find, at 
local level, all partners that it needs. In fact, according to Cowan and Jonard, 2001, and more 
generally, to literature on « Small World », this openness is even essential to catch diversity 
and to maintain a dynamic local network. 
This phenomenon is particularly important in biotech sector. Pamolli and al. (2001) show that 
a relatively small number of local clusters are capturing a dominant majority of biotechnology 
firms and of public research organisation. However, the tendency towards clustering is 
accompanied by a parallel process of increasing openness of the original clusters. Recent 
trends suggest a combination of an increasing number of collaborations and a decreasing 
proportion of local connections. For instance, in the USA, local ties moved from a high of 
40% in 1988 to a low of 8% in 1998 (Owen-Smith, Riccaboni, Pammolli, Powell, 2001), in 
the context of a rising volume of collaborations. One of the most likely reasons is the need to 
get access to state-of-art knowledge, wherever it might be located. Thus, local and a-spatial 
networks co-exist. 
 
We wonder then if local cooperation only allows spillover diffusion, as geographic proximity 
is widely needed. More precisely, as cooperative global networks allow interactions and 
innovations, we wonder if they allow spillovers spreading. We are tempted to answer 
positively, as every transfer may generate spillovers. In this case, it is worth wondering what 
the real conditions to spillovers circulation are, as it goes against the traditional results.  
 
 
4.2. SPILLOVERS DIFFUSION INSIDE NETWORKS:  THE COMPLEMENTARITY 
BETWEEN ORGANISATIONAL PROXIMITY AND TEMPORARY GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY  
 
As noticed, the main argument for localised spillovers is the tacit nature of knowledge. 
Considering knowledge flows inside an a-spatial network leads to emit doubts on the validity 
of this result, following two explanations.  
If tacit knowledge is localised in the human being (Dosi, 1996), it is largely mobile. This 
characteristic increases with the augmentation of transport facilities and the reduction of their 
cost. During cooperation, meetings can be organised between partners when they need it. The 
rest of the time, actors can exchange by using other means of communication (ICT,   17 
telephone…), especially as codified knowledge is supposed not to be subject to constraints of 
time and space. Indeed, the innovation process does not require permanent face-to-face 
interactions. The first steps of cooperation are the ones that require the more interactions. 
When tasks become more formalised, face-to-face is less important (Rallet and Torre, 2001). 
At the same time, a study on the impact of ICT in an international collaboratory shows that 
despite the development and the important use of ICT, the scientists still need to meet to 
discuss about “Science” and expertise (Gallié et Guichard, 2002). Thus, if geographic 
proximity is still essential to exchange some knowledge, it can be only temporary (Rallet and 
Torre, 2001). 
The need of meeting is confirmed by many studies on remote collaboration (cf. Studies of the 
University of Michigan). Thus, along cooperation, localised or remote partners organise 
numerous meeting (Gallié and Guichard, 2002), they can even exchange personal for the time 
of the project…. (Gertler, 2001). Network organisation would be based on a need of 
geographical proximity, this one being permanent or temporary.  
However, if geographic proximity, whether it is permanent or temporary, facilitates 
interactions and then spillovers spreading, geographic proximity is not a sufficient condition. 
In fact, being localised close to firms or universities does not mean “being in touch” with 
them.  
As noticed, to benefit from spillovers, firms must develop, as a first condition, an absorptive 
capacity. But it is not enough, especially in the case of cooperation. In fact, actors must 
understand each other to interact and then to capture spillovers. They must share common 
language and codes. This form of proximity is qualified as “organisational”. There are several 
different definitions of this concept. It can be defined as “the capacity the agent had to 
coordinate each other because of behaviour rules, formal or informal, that they acquire 
according to the membership of an organisation” (Rallet and Torre, 2001). This definition 
insists on the rules and on the fact that it is built by interactions. However, it does not take 
into account the cognitive mechanisms. 
Gilly and Torre (2000)’s definition seems more appropriated in the case of knowledge transfer. 
They consider that organisational proximity corresponds to two types of logic: 
-  The logic of memberships refers to a shared space in which relationships and 
interactions exist. Their belonging is based on coordination. Agents need common 
rules to interact. 
-  The logic of similitarity considers the common cognitive characteristics of the agents. 
They are close to each other if they share a same space of reference and knowledge. 
 
These two logics are complementary. Indeed, the logic of belonging allows to share 
organisational behaviour. For instance, interactions between university and firms can be 
particularly difficult as each one has specific logics and aims, particularly in terms of 
knowledge appropriability and diffusion (Cassier, Foray, 1999). These problems can be met 
as soon as different organisations interact. To succeed, they need to develop behaviour rules 
to coordinate their actions. The second logic is particularly important as soon as agents deal 
with knowledge transfer (voluntary or not). Agents must share common reference to 
understand each other. One important element of this second logic is the development, as a 
preliminary condition, of absorptive capacity for every organisation. In fact, the higher the 
absorptive capacity is, the higher the probability to share common knowledge is. However, it 
is not sufficient. They have to share a piece of common knowledge; this sort of organisational 
proximity is likely higher when actors realised similar activities. 
In that respect, some scholars consider that some organisations, such as communities of 
practices or epistemic communities, can allow the diffusion of tacit knowledge whatever the 
distance. These communities of practices are defined as groups of workers informally bound   18 
together by shared experience, expertise and commitment to a joint enterprise (Gertler, 2001). 
They are then a sort of informal cooperation. The commonalities shared by members of the 
community facilitate the identification, joint production and sharing of tacit knowledge 
through collaborative problem-solving assisted by story-telling and other nattative devices for 
circulating tacit knowledge. Organisational proximity is then more important than 
geographical proximity in supporting the flow of tacit knowledge (Amin and Cohendet, 
2000). Tacit knowledge may flow across regional boundaries if virtual community proximity 
is strong enough. However, geographic proximity can facilitate the development of such 
communities (Breschi and Lissoni, 2001). This type of organisation can be assimilated to 
some forms of cooperation. By extent, we hope for the same result in more formal 
cooperation 
Autant-Bernard (2000), one of the rare economists who studies cooperation as a channel of 
transmission, tests the spatial dimension of spillovers inside this organisation. She measures 
the scientific collaboration thanks to co-publications. Her analysis shows the positive role of 
scientific collaborations on the capacity of capturing spillovers. Inside the local network 
(determined by the French administrative circumscription of the ”departement”), the more 
agents interact, the more knowledge is diffused. However, their influence is rather weak (even 
if significant). Furthermore, it appears that remote spillovers are relatively little, explained by 
scientific collaborations. Scientific collaborations contribute to a narrow extent to explain 
spillovers diffusion. However, the result shows that the diffusion of spillovers is not always 
localised. In order to pursuit the analysis, the author underlines the need of taking other forms 
of interactions such as technological inter-firm cooperations. Indeed, co-publications reflect 




To conclude, these two kinds of proximity are complementary. In fact, geographic proximity 
is not sufficient. Organisational proximity is a necessary condition but is not sufficient in most 
cases, as tacit knowledge requires face-to-face relations. Thus, global network and local 
network do not differ so much. They are based on organisational and geographic proximity. 
However, the latter is not always permanent. This means that geographic proximity is not 
synonymous to co-location. 
Thus, it is not so much co-location that imports than the belonging to a network in which 
members are widely interactive. Geographic proximity itself is irrelevant: what accounts is the 
way links are organised inside this space (Castillo et al., 2002). Secrets are in networks, and 





The role of network as a means of interconnexion and of diffusion, as well as the concept of 
temporary proximity, lead us to nuance the need of the co-localisation of firms and public 
institutions in order to benefit from spillovers. Indeed, results show that spillovers are 
localised. However, being at proximity does not mean being in interaction. If geographic 
proximity facilitates interactions, it does not constitute a sufficient condition to benefit from 
spillovers.  
In that respect, we consider networks, in which links between agents are widely interactive, 
and that whatever the distance that separate them, are vectors of spillovers. Spillovers are 
localised but remain within the networks. But this does not mean the end of local network: 
their crucial role continues if they develop both geographic and organisational proximity. We 
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only propose another space for spillovers diffusion. A more advanced research leads to 
suggest that local and a-spatial network could be complementary: the first one would facilitate 
contacts and the access to local work market, more precisely for the small firms. The second 
one would allow firms to develop relations with partners chosen among a wider panel. 
These theoretical results must still be confronted to empirical analysis. If the latter confirms 
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